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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1991 session of the General Assembly enacted legislation 
dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amended, or re-
pealed a number of sections of the Code of Virginia ("Code"). In 
addition to this legislation, there were six cases from the Supreme 
Court of Virginia and one from the Virginia Court of Appeals, in 
the year ending June 1, 1991, which involve issues of interest to 
both the general practitioner and the specialist in wills, trusts, and 
estates. This article analyzes each of these legislative and judicial 
developments.1 
II. 1991 LEGISLATION 
A. Illegitimacy - Evidence of Paternity 
As a consequence of Trimble v. Gordon,2 Virginia law was 
amended in 1978 to permit an illegitimate child to inherit from the 
father, a right already existing on the maternal side.3 However, a 
concern about encouraging possible unfounded claims of paternity 
led the legislature to restrict the evidence that might be used in 
such cases" to the same six categories of proof then allowable to 
determine paternity~ in support proceedings brought against an al-
leged father on behalf of an illegitimate child. 6 This restrictive 
* Professor of Law, The T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 
1965, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1967, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of 
William and Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York University. 
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Virginia sections, they will be 
generally referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated, 
those section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections'' and to the 1991 
supplement for the new sections. 
2. 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (inheritance rights of illegitimate children). 
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991). The background of this development is 
discussed in Johnson, Inheritance Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 275 
(1978). 
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.2 (Repl. Vol. 1987). 
5. Id. § 20-61.1 (repealed & amended 1988); see id § 20-49.1 to -49.8 (Repl. Vol. 1990). 
6. Trimble recognized that "(t)he more serious problems of proving paternity might jus-
tify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' es-
925 
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support statute was declared unconstitutional in 1985 because 
"[s]uch restrictions on the available methods of proof imposed an 
impenetrable barrier resulting in the kind of invidious discrimina-
tion contemplated by Gomez."7 
This ruling of unconstitutionality of the source for section 64.1-
5.2 of the Code naturally raised the question of the latter section's 
constitutionality.8 The legislature appears to have concluded that 
the section was· unconstitutional, as evidenced by the nature of its 
1991 amendments to section 64.1-5.2. In addition to expanding the 
categories of admissible evidence from six to eight, 9 the introduc-
tion to this list was changed from "shall be limited to the follow-
ing" to "may include but shall not be limited to the following" 
and, most importantly, this enactment was passed as emergency 
legislation, 10 with a proviso that "the provisions of this act are de-
claratory of existing law."11 It seems rather obvious that the only 
way the "shall not be limited to" language of the amendment could 
be declaratory of existing law would be if the prior statutory lan-
guage of "shall be limited to" was unconstitutional. 
The 1991 legislation effectively eliminates the evidentiary limita-
tion faced by illegitimates in succession litigation since 1978.12 
However, illegitimate persons, or those claiming through them, still 
tates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' es-
tates or for legitimate children generally." 430 U.S. at 770. 
7. Jones v. Robinson, 229 Va. 276, 287, 329 S.E.2d 794, 801 (1985) (consolidating sub. 
nom. Jones v. Robinson, Whiteman v. Kelley, and Vivier v. Page) (referring to Gomez v. 
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1983)). The court's decision applied only to § 20-61.1 as it existed prior 
to its expansion in 1982, which was the same language it contained in 1978 when it served as 
the basis for § 64.1-5.2. 
8. See Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 779, 792-94 (1985). 
9. The added categories are as follows: 
7. The results of medically reliable genetic blood grouping tests weighted with all the 
evidence; or 
8. Medical or anthropological evidence relating to the alleged parentage of the child 
based on tests performed by experts. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.2 (Cum Supp. 1991). 
10. Act of March 22, 1991, ch. 479, 1991 Va. Acts, cl. 3 (to be codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 
64.1-5.Z) (emphasis added). Emergency legislation becomes effective immediately upon be-
ing signed by the governor. Thus, instead of becoming effective on July 1, this legislation 
was effective when signed by the governor on March 22, 1991. 
11. Id. cl. 2. 
12. Although § 64.1-5.2 of the Code is located in that portion of the Code relating to 
intestate succession, its language expressly provides that it is applicable "(f]or purposes of 
this title," thereby making it applicable to cases involving testate succession as well. 
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face a time restriction not applicable to legitimate persons13 which 
may be unconstitutionally discriminatory.14 
B. Legitimation of Children - Reproductive Technology 
Section 64.1-7.1 of the Code, previously dealing with the legiti-
mation of children conceived by means of the artificial insemina-
tion of a married woman, is extended to also cover children con-
ceived by in vitro fertilization or other reproductive technology 
which uses the ·sperm of a donor, other than her husband, or an 
ovum from another woman, or both. In all of these cases, if the 
woman and her husband consent in writing to the reproductive 
technology and to accept parentage of any resulting child, such 
child "shall be, for all purposes, the legitimate natural child of 
such woman and her husband."111 This legislation, intended in part 
to confine the impact of erroneous statements of law in Welborn v. 
Commonwealth16 to the parties of that case, also provides that 
neither sperm nor ova donors have either parental rights or duties 
in regard to such a child, and that its provisions are declaratory of 
existing law.17 
C. Power to Invade Principal - Constructional Rule 
Section 64.1-67.2 was added to the Code in 1988 in order to 
eliminate any estate, 18 gift, 19 or income tax20 exposure in trusts 
13. Section 64.1-5.1.3 of the Code provides that "[n]o claim of succession based on the 
relationship between a child born out of wedlock and a parent of such child shall be recog-
ni2ed in the settlement of any decedent's estate unless" an affidavit alleging parenthood and 
an action seeking a circuit court proceeding to determine parenthood are filed "within one 
year of the date of the death of such parent." 
14. This issue was raised in Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 955, 964-66 (1986). Since that time, the decision in Tulsa 
Professional Collection Serv. Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), has raised another possible 
ground of constitutional challenge. In broad scope, Pope held that when state action has an 
adverse effect upon a person's property right, it violates the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment unless it is accompanied by reasonable notice. An illegitimate's claim of 
succession is clearly a property right. Note also the Code's provision that the one-year provi-
sion of § 64.1-5.1.3 of the Code, quoted in supra note 13, "shall run notwithstanding the 
minority of such child." 
15. VA. ConE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
16. 10 Va. App. 631, 394 S.E.2d 732 (Va. Ct. App. 1990); see infra note 100 and accompa-
nying text. 
17. Act of Mar. 6, 1991, ch. 89, 1 1991 Va. Acts 119, cl. 2. 
18. I.R.C. § 2041 provides, for estate tax purposes, that a decedent's gross estate includes 
the value of property over which the decedent had a general power of appointment at death. 
19. I.R.C. § 2514 provides, for gift tax purposes, that a person who makes a lifetime exer-
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where the drafter mistakenly gave a fiduciary, who was also a ben-
eficiary, a power to invade principal for the fiduciary/beneficiary's 
benefit.21 The thrust of the statute is to either reduce the power 
from a general to a special, or to take the power away from the 
fiduciary/beneficiary entirely. The 1991 amendments to section 
64.1-67.2 of the Code are intended to clarify the original enact-
ment22 and, to that end, they are stated to be declaratory of ex-
isting law.23 Note that the remedy of this section is applicable only 
to powers over the principal of a trust.24 However, the problem this 
statute seeks to eliminate can also arise when the .fiduciary"/bene.fi-
ciary has a comparable power over trust income. Thus, further 
amendment of the statute to provide a similar remedy for such in-
come powers is desirable. 
D. Pretermitted ·Spouse 
Section 64.1-69.1 was added to the Code in 198525 to provide an-
other remedy for a surviving spouse for whom no provision was 
made in a deceased spouse's premarital will, if such nonprovision 
was unintentional.26 Accordingly, the section expressly provided 
cise or release of a general power of appointment is treated as a transferor of the property 
subject to the power. 
20. I.R.C. § 678 provides, for income tax purposes, that one holding a general power of 
appointment over property is treated as the owner of that property. 
21. For background and discussion, see Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Re-
view of Virginia Law, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 759, 764-66 (1988). 
22. These clarifications are intended to rebut a possible IRS challenge. As one writer has 
noted: 
The IRS had challenged comparable rules of construction in other jurisdictions on 
two opposing theories: that the statutes are ineffective because their sole purpose was 
tax avoidance, see Sheedy v. U.S., 63 AFTR 2d 11 148,958 (E.D. Wis. 1988); or that 
they are inapplicable whenever the governing instrument states any standard, regard-
less of how broad or limited. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8912014 (12/12/88). To avoid these 
extreme positions, the amendment attempts to define (and thereby limit) the situa-
tions in which the statutory rule of construction will not apply. It makes the rule 
applicable unless: 
a. The testator or settlor expressly manifests a contrary intention by referring to 
a fiduciary's invasion or use of trust funds 'for the fiduciary's own benefit' or 'with-
out regard to the fiduciary's personal benefit' or words of similar import or by re-
ferring to VA. CODE § 64.1-67.2 specifically; or 
b. A court construes the document to the contrary. 
Gray, Selected Virginia Legislative Developments, 8 Va. St. Bar Tr. & Est. Newsl. No. 3, at 
3 (Summer 1991). 
23. Act of Mar. 20, 1991, ch. 432, 1 1991 Va. Acts 1263, cl. 2. 
24. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-67.2 (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
25. For background, see supra note 8, at 787. 
26. At the time of the enactment, in 1985, the omitted surviving spouse's remedies were 
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that its remedy of an intestate share for the omitted survivmg 
spouse would not apply if it appeared from the will that the omis-
sion was intentional. The 1991 amendment further provides for the 
nonavailability of this remedy if it appears "from the provisions of 
a premarital or marital agreement executed or validated under the 
Premarital Agreement Act{§ 20-147 et seq.)" that the omission of 
the surviving spouse was intentional.27 The need for this amend-
ment might at first seem doubtful. This is because if the right to a 
pretermitted spouse's share was yielded in such a contract, the 
spouse's claim should be offset by an equivalent claim by the es-
tate for breach of the contract. However, the remedy of the statute 
is automatic and mandatory -"the omitted spouse shall receive 
•••• "
28 Accordingly, as there is no need for the surviving spouse 
to make any claim in order to take, there is no corresponding crea-
tion of an offsetting claim in favor of the decedent's estate. There-
fore, the amendment was necessary to eliminate the right to such a 
share in instances where it had been waived. 
The 1991 amendment does not solve the problem of this section; 
it only remedies one of its symptoms. Although this section was 
based upon a concept contained in Uniform Probate Code 
("UPC") section 2-301(a),29 the legislature failed to include certain 
UPC language that (i) should have eliminated the need for the pre-
sent amendment, and (ii) would have closed other loopholes still 
remaining. This omitted language would also deny the section's 
remedy if "the testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside 
the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamen-
tary provision is shown by statements of the testator or from the 
amount of the transfer or other evidence."30 It would appear that 
further, comprehensive amendment of this statute is necessary to 
deal with other problems before they arise or, in light of the new 
protections provided for a surviving spouse in the 1990 augmented 
estates' legislation, perhaps it is time to repeal this section. 
(i) to claim dower or curtesy in the decedent's realty under §§ 64.1-19 to -44, and (ii) to 
claim a statutory forced share in the decedent's personalty under §§ 64.1-13 to -16. Since 
January 1, 1991, these remedies have been replaced by one remedy: an elective share in 
realty and personalty in the decedent's augmented estate. For background and discussion of 
this development, see Gray, Virginia's Augmented Estate System: Annual Survey of Vir-
ginia Law, 24 U. R1cH. L. REV. 513 (1990). 
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-69.1 (Interim Supp. 1991). 
28. Id. (emphasis added). 
29. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-301(a), 8 U.L.A. 88 (1983). 
30. This section of the UPC was itself amended in 1990 to further restrict the availability 
of its remedy. 
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E. Pour Over Trust - Residency of Trustee 
Section 64.1-73 of the Code is amended to provide that certain 
nonresidents may serve as the sole trustee of an inter vivos trust 
without thereby disqualifying the trust from receiving testamen-
tary additions. 31 The listing of authorized nonresidents conforms 
with the listing found in a similar statute applicable to personal 
representatives and testamentary trustees. 32 Again paralleling this 
latter statute, section· 64.1-73 of the Code requires that, prior to 
any distribution to the trustee of a pour over trust that has no 
Virginia cotrustee, (i) the nonresident must appoint a resident 
agent for receipt of process in trust related matters, and (ii) "bond 
with surety shall be required in every case."33 
One question left unanswered by the new amendment is whether 
the amount of the bond and surety must correspond to the value of 
the entire inter vivos trust, or only to the testamentary addition 
thereto. From both a logical and a policy analysis it would appear 
that the latter possibility is the correct answer. A second unan-
swered question is what mechanism, if any, insures the continuing 
sufficiency of this bond and surety? This question is not so easily 
answered. In the case of a testamentary trustee, section 26-2 of the 
Code requires the commissioner of accounts to examine the suffi-
ciency of the bond and surety of a testamentary trustee as part of 
the commissioner's inspection of the testamentary trustee's annual 
accounting. However, as the trustee of an inter vivos trust is not 
required to make such an accounting, and as section 64.1-73(d)(l) 
of the Code provides that a testamentary pour over to such a trust 
"shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust of the testa-
tor," there appears to be no procedure under existing law to insure 
the continuing sufficiency of the bond and surety. 
31. The listing includes: 
a parent, brother, or sister of the testator, a child or other descendant of the testator, 
the spouse of a child of the testator, the surviving spouse of the testator, or a person 
or all such persons otherwise eligible to file a statement in lieu of an accounting pur-
suant of § 26-20.1, or any combination of them. 
VA. ConE ANN. § 64.1-73(3)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
32. Id. § 26-59(B). 
33. Id. § 64.1-73(A)(2)(iii). 
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F. Trust Reformation, Consolidation and Termination 
The new section 55-19.4 of the Code authorizes the judicial ref-
ormation of any trust, upon petition by a beneficiary or fiduciary 
and a finding of good cause,34 "in any manner,35 including, without 
limitation, dividing a trust into two or more separate trusts,36 con-
solidating two or more separate trusts into a single trust, 37 or ter-
minating the trust36 and ordering distribution of the trust property 
regardless of any spendthrift or similar protective provision." In 
addition to finding "good cause"39 for any reformation, the court 
must generally also find that any proposed reformation "will 
neither materially impair the accomplishment of the trust pur-
poses nor ... adversely affect the interests of any beneficiary." 
These additional findings, however, are not required in termination 
cases.40 This enactment was passed as emergency legislation41 and 
34. According to the Code: 
For purposes of any reformation of a trust, good cause may be shown by evidence of 
(i) changes in any federal or Virginia tax laws, or the construction of such laws, 
whether by statute, court decision, regulation, ruling or otherwise which, in the ab-
sence of reformation, would materially impair the purposes of the trust or adversely 
affect the interests of the trustor or any beneficiary, or which, if reformation were 
made, would materially benefit the trust or the interests of the trustor or any benefi-
ciary or (ii) existing circumstances such that the purposes of the trust will be im-
paired or the interests of the trustor or any beneficiary adversely affected if the refor-
mation is not made or that reformation if made would benefit the trust or interests of 
the trustor or any beneficiary. 
VA. CooE ANN.§ 55-19.4D(l) (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
35. The potential scope of permissible reformation is further evidenced by the provision 
that "[t]he court may order that the reformation be effective prospectively only or be retro-
active to the date of the trust's creation, the date of death of the trustor or testator or such 
other date as the court may direct." Id. § 55-19.4(C). 
36. This enactment repeals the provision for judicial division of a trust formerly found in 
§ 55-19.3(B); the provision for nonjudicial division, formerly designated as subsection A of 
that section, is now the only subject of§ 55-193. See id. § 55-19.3. 
37. The court must find that the dispositive provisions of trusts are substantially similar 
before ordering their consolidation. Id. § 55-19.4(B)(l). 
38. According to the Code: 
For purposes of termination of a trust, good cause may be shown as set forth in sub-
division 1 of this subsection [the "good cause" required for reformation, set out in 
note 39, infra] or by evidence that (i) the costs of administration are such that the 
establishment or the continuance of the trust would impair the purposes of the trust, 
or (ii) the value of the trust principal is $25,000 or less, with no expectation of addi-
tions to the principal other than from interest or other earnings. 
Id. § 55-19.4(D)(2). 
39. See supra note 38. As the elements of this definition are stated in the alternative, the 
requirement of "good cause" reduces to no more than a finding "that reformation if made 
would benefit ••• the trustor or any beneficiary." Id. § 55-19.4(D)(l). 
40. In exempting termination from the immediately preceding requirements in the text, 
the statute parts company with the Claflin Rule [so named because derived from Claflin v. 
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as declaratory of existing law.42 
In the hands of a judge who is a literalist, or who is untutored in 
this area of the law, this new termination procedure can be used to 
destroy much of what estate planning is all about. Look, for exam-
ple, at what can happen in the ordinary case of a parent who pro-
vides a trust for the lifetime of a child - or one spouse for another 
- and the beneficiary seeks termination thereof. As "good cause" 
can be established by showing that termination would benefit the 
life tenant,43 and as "materially impair[ing] the accomplishment of 
the trust purposes" is of no concern in termination cases,44 it is 
clear that such a trust. could be terminated. And it is equally clear 
that this possibility is a reversal of existing Virginia law confirmed 
by the Virginia Supreme Court as recently as 1990.45 
What does this new provision do to the heretofore hallowed con-
cept of testator's, or settlor's, intent? How does an attorney pro-
tect a client's intent from such mischief, particularly as the statute 
specifically authorizes "terminating the trust and ordering distri-
bution of the trust property regardless of any spendthrift or simi-
lar protective provision?"46 Absent remedial action to restrict the 
scope of this statute, it may be that the prudent Virginia attorney 
will be forced to create trusts under the laws of other jurisdictions 
in order to insure that a client's legitimate purposes will not be 
Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889)] which precludes termination that would (i) defeat 
a testator's (settlor's) material purpose, or (ii) adversely affect the interests of any non-
consenting beneficiary. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959). The Supreme 
Court of Virginia recently applied the Claflin Rule in Landmark Communications v. Sovran 
Bank, 239 Va. 158, 387 S.E.2d 484 (1990). This enactment also repeals the former provision 
for termination of small trusts, which required that "[t]he court shall be satisfied that the 
termination of the trust will not cause the purposes of the trust to fail so far as these can be 
achieved with the limited funds." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.2, repealed by Act of Mar. 20, 
1991, ch. 415, 1 1991 Va. Acts 621, cl. 3. -
41. Act of March 20, 1991, ch. 415, 11991 Va. Acts 621, cl. 4. Because the legislation was 
designated as emergency legislation, the enactment became law upon being signed by the 
governor on March 20, 1991. Regular legislation is effective on July 1 of the year of 
enactment. 
42. Id. at 622, cl. 2 (which also provides "however, this declaration shall not be construed 
so as to affect the rights of the parties to any action, litigation, or proceeding commenced by 
filing prior to July 1, 1991."). 
43. "[G]ood cause may be shown by evidence that reformation [termination] ... would 
benefit ... any beneficiary." VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-19.4(0)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
44. Id. § 55-19.4(B)(2)(i). 
45. See Landmark Communications v. Sovran Bank, 239 Va. 158, 387 S.E.2d 484 (1990), 
and cases therein cited. 
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
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frustrated. 47 
G. Creation of Trust - Structured Settlements 
Section 8.01-424 of the Code provides for court approval of com-
promises on behalf of persons under disability in suits or actions to 
which they are parties. The 1991 amendment grants the court au-
thority to approve a minor's settlement in trust, with the minor's 
guardian or parent serving as trustee.48 An interesting clause reads 
that "the court may provide for the termination of such trust at 
any time following attainment of majority which the court deems 
to be in the best interest of the minor."49 There should be no prob-
lem with extending such a trust beyond the age of majority for an 
incapacitated beneficiary. However, the authority for withholding a 
competent trust beneficiary's property after the beneficiary reaches 
the age of majority appears dubious and any such attempt would 
seem to invite legal challenge. 
H. Bona Fid~ Purchasers of Decedents' Realty 
The Code contains several statutes designed to protect bona fide 
purchasers of a decedent's realty from claims made under after 
discovered wills unless they are probated within one year of the 
decedent's death.110 A new provision, section 64.1-96.1 of the Code, 
protects bona fide purchasers of a decedent's realty from a devisee 
or personal representative under a will which is subsequently im-
peached, against claims made by the decedent's heirs, unless the 
heirs file a bill in equity for that purpose within one year after 
testator's death. The statute provides no remedy for the parallel 
case where the impeachment of a will results in the establishment 
47. "Reformation" is defined as an "[e]quitable remedy used to reframe written contracts 
to reflect accurately real agreement between contracting parties when, either through mu-
tual mistake or unilateral mistake coupled with actual or equitable fraud by other party, the 
writing does not embody the contract as actually made." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1152 (5th 
ed. 1979). 
Ironically, the destruction of testator's (settlor's) original purpose that is authorized by 
this unfortunate provision is to be accomplished pursuant to a procedure labeled "reforma-
tion,'' which is the name of a well-recognized common law remedy for accomplishing original 
intent. 
48. Note that under express language added to§ 55-19(C) in 1990, such a trust could not 
be a spendthrift trust preventing the minor beneficiary's creditors from having access 
thereto. VA. ConE ANN.§ 55-19(C) (Cum. Supp. 1990). 
49. Id. § 8.01-424(D)(4). 
50. Id. § 64.1-95 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (protects purchasers from the heirs); Id.§ 64.1-96 (pro-
tecting purchasers from devisees or appropriately empowered personal representatives). 
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of a prior will, instead of intestacy, and the statute's language -
"impeachment . . . which results in intestacy" will apparently ne-
gate any possible intent-oriented construction of the statute to 
that end. 
I. Estate Mismanagement - Prior Personal Representative 
Section 64.1-166 of the Code is amended to repeal the rule of 
Coleman v. M'Murdo51 which states that an administrator de bonis 
non does not have standing to bring suit against a former personal 
representative for mismanagement of estate assets. 52 The language 
of the statute that appears to be consistent with Coleman is elimi-
nated and further language is added providing that an administra-
tor de bonis non "shall" be entitled to bring such a suit. 
J. Estate Distribution - Show Cause Order 
Section 64.1-179 of the Code authorizes the issuance of a "show 
cause against distribution" order after six months have passed 
from the qualification of the personal representative. The section 
had provided that the motion might be made by the personal rep-
resentative, a legatee or a distributee. The 1991 amendment adds 
to this group "a successor or substitute personal representative" in 
such a way as to indicate that the six-month waiting period will be 
computed from the qualification date of the original personal rep-
resentative and not from that of the successor or substitute.153 
K. Fiduciary Investments - Legal List 
Virginia fiduciaries seeking guidance in the fulfillment of their 
investment duty may elect to follow the statutory prudent man 
rule or the statutory legal list. This latter concept, codified in sec-
tion 26-40 of the Code, identifies specific investments and provides 
that they "are and shall be considered lawful investments." In rec-
ognition of the breakup of American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company ("A.T.&T.") into the "baby bells," section 26-40(16) of 
the Code, a subsection previously occupied only by A.T.&T., is 
amended to also include Bell Atlantic, Bell South, Southwestern 
51. 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 51 (1827). 
52. According to Coleman, only creditors or beneficiaries have the requisite standing to 
bring such an action. Id. 
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-179 (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
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Bell, Pacific Telesis, Nynex, American Information Technologies, 
and U.S. West.M 
In addition to this amendment to the legal list, the legislature 
also passed a resolution requesting the Wills, Trusts and Estates 
Section of the Virginia Bar Atisociation and the Virginia Bankers' 
Association to "study the status of Virginia's lawful fiduciary in-
vestments, to recommend amendments, deletions and additions to 
the list and to make other recommendations as deemed appropri-
ate."1515 This study request was premised upon findings that (i) 
there are extremely safe and valuable investments not on the list, 
(ii) there are investments presently on the list not as safe or valua-
ble as when placed thereon, (iii) there has been no substantial 
modification of the list for many years, and (iv) "the current limits 
upon fiduciaries may hamper reasonable investment."156 
L. Commissioners of Accounts - Posting 
Section 26-27 of the Code requires commissioners of accounts to 
post a list of accounts before them for settlement, along with cer-
tain information regarding these accounts, 157 at the front door of 
the relevant courthouse. The 1991 amendment changes the date 
for such postings from the first Monday in any month to any day 
"during the first week of each month."158 
M. Self Dealing - Banks and Trust Companies 
Section 6.1-24 of the Code, which governs self-dealing by trust 
companies, trust subsidiaries, and banks when serving as a trustee, 
has been expanded. It now encompasses self-dealing by these insti-
tutions when serving as a personal representative, applies to trans-
actions with directors thereof, and is declared to be permissible in 
limited instances.159 The rule relating to transfers from one estate 
to another where both have the same fiduciary, formerly judged by 
54. Id. § 26-40. 
55. HJR No. 395, 2 1991 Va. Acts 1928. 
56. Id. 
57. This information must include the names of the fiduciaries, the nature of their ac-
counts, and the name of the persons or entities represented in the accounts. 
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-27 (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
59. The section declares self-dealing transactions to be voidable unless "(i) approved by 
an appropriate court, (ii) consented to by all beneficiaries after full and fair disclosure, (iii) 
authorized by the instrument creating the fiduciary relationship or (iv) permitted by ruling 
of the Commissioner of financial institutions." Id. § 6.1-24. 
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satisfying the requirements of section 26-40 (the legal list), will 
now be judged by being a permissible :fiduciary investment under 
any of the provisions found in Title 26 of the Code. 60 
N. Health Care Decisions - Power of Attorney 
Section 37.1-134.4 was added to the Code in 1989 to establish 
additional procedures for surrogate treatment decision making on 
behalf of adult persons who, due to illness or injury which pre-
cludes communication or impairs judgment, are unable to make in-
formed medical decisions. 61 The 1991 amendments (i) elevate an 
authorized agent under a durable power of attorney from priority 
number three under the statute to priority number one, 62 and (ii) 
eliminate the need for a provider of treatment to make a reasona-
ble inquiry to determine if action authorized by a surrogate would 
be protested by the patient.63 
This section of the Code was also the subject of a 1990 Attorney 
General's opinion which concluded that a surrogate decision maker 
"is authorized to consent to the withholding or withdrawal of med-
ical treatment, including nutrition and hydration, from an individ-
ual in a persistent vegetative state or irreversible coma, provided 
all statutory requirements of § 37.1-134.4 are met."64 
0. Natural Death Act - Persistent Vegetative State - Nutri-
tion and Hydration - Statutory Form 
Section 54.1-2982 of the Code, the definitional section of Vir-
ginia's Natural Death Act, is amended to change (A) the definition 
of "terminal condition" by (i) replacing "medical certainty" with 
"medical probability," (ii) including "persistent vegetative state," 
and (iii) providing a definition for this latter term;65 and (B) the 
60. Id. 
61. For background and discussion, see Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Re-
view of Virginia Law, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 859, 862-63 (1989). 
62. VA. ConE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
63. Id. at § 37.1-134.4(D). 
64. 1990 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 205 (Sept. 18, 1990). 
65. The complete definition now reads: 
'Terminal condition' means a condition caused by injury, disease or illness from 
which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, (i) there can be no recovery and 
(ii) death is imminent. The term also means a persistent vegetative state, in which a 
qualified patient has suffered a loss of consciousness, with no behavioral evidence of 
self-awareness or awareness of surroundings in a learned manner, other than reflex 
activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned response and from which, to a 
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definition of "life-prolonging procedure" by adding a sentence 
reading "[t]he term includes nutrition and hydration." Section 
54.1-2984 of the Code, dealing with the suggested forms66 of writ-
ten declaration, is also amended (i) to eliminate certain language 
from both forms,67 and (ii) to provide that "[t]he declarant may 
also include a statement directing any specific procedure or treat-
ment to be provided, such as hydration and nutrition." 
These amendments were obviously prompted by the increased 
public attention to living wills as a result of the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Cruzan v. Director Missouri Department 
of Health68 and by a related Opinion of the Attorney General of 
Virginia. 69 The net effect of these amendments is to authorize the 
withholding or withdrawal of artificially supplied nutrition and hy-
dration for persons in a persistent vegetative state, or an irreversi-
ble coma,70 unless the patient has made an affirmation to the con-
trary. These amendments specifically apply to previously existing 
declarations. 71 
reasonable degree of medical probability, there can be no recovery. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 54.1-2982 (Cum. Supp. 1991). 
66. Id. § 54.1-2984 (Rep!. Vol. 1991) provides a form for a person to make a decision, and 
another form for a person to appoint an agent to make a decision on the person's behalf. 
67. The second paragraph of both the declaration and the agency form had provided in 
part as follows: "If at any time I should have a terminal condition [and my attending physi-
cian has determined that there can be no recovery from such condition, my death is immi-
nent,] . .•. " In the 1991 version, the italicized language in brackets has been eliminated. 
68. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). 
69. The Attorney General opined that a declaration under Virginia's Natural Death Act 
would not authorize the withdrawal of artificially supplied nutrition and hydration from a 
person in a persistent vegetative state or an irreversible coma unless the patient "has been 
certified in writing by his or her physician to be in a terminal condition." As terminal condi-
tion was defined at that time to require that the patient's death be "imminent," this re-
quirement practically eliminated the possibility of any action in the case of a patient in a 
persistent vegetative state or irreversible coma. 1990 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. at 208. 
70. The term "irreversible coma" is not included within the language of the statutory 
definition of "terminal condition" found in § 54.1-2982 of the Code, and this term does not 
have a precise meaning in the medical-legal community. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 
(Rep!. Vol. 1991). However, as this term may be most frequently used by the consumer and 
professional alike to mean a permanent loss of all consciousness, it would appear to be in-
cluded within the statutory definition of "persistent vegetative state." This definition is 
found in supra note 65. The term "irreversible coma" would also seem to encompass the 
patient's condition in Hazelton v. Powhatan Nursing Home, Inc., 6 Va. Cir. 414 (County of 
Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1986). 
71. "The provisions of this act shall apply to any declaration executed pursuant to § 54.1-
2983 without regard to the date on which it was executed." Act of Mar. 25, 1991, ch. 583, 1 
1991 Va. Acts 1043, 1044, cl. 2. 
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III. 1990-91 JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A. Inter Vivos Gifts - Delivery 
[Vol. 25:925 
In Young v. Young,12 a father directed his sister, who held the 
bulk of his stock in his corporation in a trust for him, to transfer 
some of his stock to his daughters on six occasions over a five year 
period. Although new stock certificates were issued in the daugh-
ters' names on each occasion, and the corporate stock transfer 
ledger reflected their ownership, the daughters were only aware of 
the first transfer and this stock was the only stock actually deliv-
ered to them. On the other five occasions, without the daughters' 
knowledge or consent, the father signed the daughters' names in 
the stock transfer ledger, followed by the notation "[father] Atty.," 
to evidence their receipt. 73 
Although the corporate records and the certificates in the daugh-
ters' names are prima facie evidence of their ownership, the court 
determined that this evidence " 'possesses no such magic or sacred-
ness as to prevent an inquiry into the facts.' "74 Delivery and ac-
ceptance are common law requirements for an inter vivos gift. 
These requirements are not eliminated by the statutes relating to 
security transfers;75 indeed these statutes further condition an ef-
fective transfer of securities upon the tra,nsferee (or the trans-
feree's designee) acquiring possession thereof. The court held that 
"[b]ecause the disputed securities were never delivered to the 
daughters nor to anyone designated by the daughters to receive 
them, no inter vivos gift was ever made. "76 
B. Causa Mortis Gift - Delivery 
Fourteen years before his death, the donor in Brown v. Metz11 
delivered a key to his safe deposit box to a donee. The donee testi-
fied78 that, shortly prior to the donor's death, the donor told him 
72. 240 Va. 57, 393 S.E.2d 398 (1990). 
73. Id. at 60, 393 S.E.2d at 399. 
74. Id. at 62, 393 S.E.2d at 400 (quoting Swan v. Swan's Ex'r, 136 Va. 496, 519, 117 S.E. 
858, 865 (1923)). 
75. The court's decision also dealt with the effectiveness of the alleged gift from the 
standpoint of the requirements for the transfer of securities under the Virginia Uniform 
Commercial Code, VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.1-201(32) (Cum. Supp. 1991); Id.§§ 8.8-102, -309, -313 
(Added Vol. 1965). 
76. 240 Va. at 64, 393 S.E.2d at 401 (1990) (emphasis in original). 
77. 240 Va. 127, 393 S.E.2d 402 (1990). 
78. It was contended that the donee's testimony was insufficient to sustain the alleged gift 
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to" 'empty the contents of the box and give to [Brown] what has 
her name on it, and the rest was to be for my use and my family 
use.' "79 The donee further testified that on the day following his 
removal of the box's contents he informed the donor of this fact 
and the donor replied "'Good.' "80 
The court rejected the. contention that, to make a valid delivery 
under these circumstances, the donee had to actually place the 
gifted property in the donor's hands in order that donor might 
then make a manual delivery thereof to the donee. "[W]e have not 
retreated to such a formalistic approach and refuse to do so here. 
Delivery occurred when the donee, at the donor's instruction, re-
moved the bonds from the donor's custody and exercised dominion 
and control over them. "81 
C. Inter Vivos Gifts - Questions of Fact 
In Stone v. Alley,82 the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
for plaintiff was held to be erroneous because of three material 
questions of fact in dispute. These questions were (i) the existence 
of donative intent, (ii) whether Paine Webber Company was a "fi-
nancial institution" within the meaning of that term in section 6.1-
125.3(A) of the Code, and (iii) whether Paine Webber securities 
held as joint tenants with the right of survivorship are an "ac-
count" within the meaning of that term in section 6.1-125.3(A) of 
the Code.83 
D. Holographic Will - Disinterested Witnesses 
Bowers v. Huddleston84 arose out of an attempt to probate a ho-
lographic will which, among other matters, required the testimony 
of two disinterested witnesses that the putative will was wholly in 
without corroboration under the deadman's statute (VA. ConE ANN. § 8.01-397). The court 
concluded that this rule was not applicable because the donee's testimony was given when 
he was called as an adverse witness and was not inherently improbable or contradicted. 240 
Va. at 131-32, 393 S.E.2d at 404 (citing Balderson v. Robertson, 203 Va. 484, 488, 125 S.E.2d 
180, 184 (1962). 
79. Id. at 129, 393 S.E.2d at 403. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 131-32, 393 S.E.2d at 404. 
82. 240 Va. 162, 392 S.E.2d 486 (1990). 
83. Id. at 163, 392 S.E.2d at 486. 
84. 241 Va. 83, 399 S.E.2d 811 (1991). 
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the testator's handwriting.811 One of the persons who testified 
clearly qualified as a disinterested witness. The court held that in 
regard to the other person, "[t]he specific question is whether an 
expert's testimony, comparing the will with exemplars of the testa-
tor's handwriting, is sufficient without proof, by a disinterested 
witness, that the exemplars were themselves in the testator's hand-
writing. The chancellor held such testimony insufficient, and we 
agree."86 
E. Will Construction - Life Tenant's Income Right 
The primary issue in Sturgis v. Stinson87 was the life tenant's 
rights to income when an asset with a fair market value of 
$1,500,000.00, comprising 75% of trust corpus, yielded a net in-
come of only $1,265.99. In a five to two decision, the court noted 
that "[w]e have not previously addressed the duty of a :fiduciary 
regarding the level of productivity of trust assets in circumstances 
where there are successive beneficiaries and no explicit instruction 
by the testator concerning that duty."88 To help decide this issue, 
the court adopted89 several general principles set out in the Re-
statement of Trusts.90 The majority concluded that these princi-
ples "define a trustee's obligations under the 'prudent man rule'91 
regarding productivity of trust assets,"92 and remanded the case to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent therewith. On a 
secondary issue, the majority further concluded that the principles 
relating to delayed income93 "are also applicable here"94 and 
85. VA. CooE ANN. § 64.1-49 (Repl. Vol. 1987). 
86. Bowers, 241 Va. at 84, 399 S.E.2d at 812. 
87. 241 Va. 531, 404 S.E.2d 56 (1991). 
88. Id. at 538, 404 S.E.2d at 60. 
89. Id. at 538, 404 S.E.2d at 60. 
90. The first principle provides as follows: "The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary 
to use reasonable care and skill to make the trust property productive." RESTATEMENT (SEC· 
OND) OF TRUSTS § 181 (1959). The second principle provides as follows: 
Unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust, if property held in trust to 
pay the income to a beneficiary for a designated period and thereafter to pay the 
principal to another beneficiary produces no income or an income substantially less 
that the current rate of return on trust investments, and is likely to continue unpro-
ductive or under-productive, the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary entitled to 
the income to sell such property within a reasonable time. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 240 (1959). 
91. For the prudent man rule see VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1 (Repl. Vol. 1985). 
92. 241 Va. at 538, 404 S.E.2d at 60. 
93. The principles of delayed income referred to by the court, found in Virginia's Uniform 
Principle and Income Act were (i) the provision entitling the income beneficiary to share in 
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should also be considered on remand. 
F. Separation Agreement - Impact on Will Provisions 
In Blunt v. Lentz,95 a wife neglected to revoke her will in favor 
of her husband following their separation. Upon the wife's death 
the children claimed that the husband had waived his right to take 
under the wife's will in their separation agreement, and thus the 
children were her successors in interest. Although the separation 
agreement contained general language whereby the husband and 
wife released each other from all claims and demands arising from 
their relationship as husband and wife, "[n]othing in the agree-
ment affects the husband's capacity to inherit as a beneficiary of 
the wife's will."96 Accordingly, the trial court decision in favor of 
the children was reversed. 
G. Legitimacy - Artificial Insemination 
Prior to the 1978 revision of children's inheritance rights,97 the 
intestate succession provisions of the Code contained three sec-
tions dealing with the legitimation of children. As a part of the 
1978 revision, former section 64.1-6 of the Code (dealing with legit-
imation by marriage and recognition) and former section 64.1-7 of 
the Code (dealing with legitimation of issue born of illegal, void or 
dissolved marriages) were somewhat rewritten, combined into a 
new section, and relocated to the domestic relations title of the 
Code.98 However, left untouched in the 1978 revision was section 
delayed income during the period of delay, from § 55-263(1), (ii) the definition of delayed 
income, from § 55-263(2), and (iii) the calculation of the period of delay, from § 55-263(3). 
Id. at 539, 404 S.E.2d at 60-61 (citing VA. ConE ANN. §§ 55-253 to -268. (Repl. Vol. 1986)). 
94. Id. at 539, 404 S.E.2d at 61. 
95. 241 Va. 547, 404 S.E.2d 62 (1991). 
96. Id. at 551, 404 S.E.2d at 64-65. The court goes on to note that it has repeatedly 
stated: · 
It is the function of the court to construe the contract made by the parties, not to 
make a contract for them. The question for the court is what did the parties agree to 
as evidenced by their contract. The guiding light in the construction of a contract is 
the intention of the parties as expressed by them in the words they have used, and 
courts are bound to say that the parties intended what the written instrument 
plainly declares. 
Id. at 552, 404 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting Great Falls Hardware v. South Lakes Village Center, 
238 Va. 123, 125-26, 380 S.E.2d 642, 643-44 (1989)) (emphasis in original). 
97. For background and discussion, see Johnson, supra note 3. 
98. This was accomplished as a part of 1978 General Assembly action. The new combined 
section, provides as follows: 
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64.1-7.1 of the Code, which provided as follows: 
Any child born to a married woman, which was conceived by means 
of artificial insemination performed by a licensed physician at the 
request of and with the consent in writing of such woman and her 
husband shall be presumed, for all purposes the legitimate natural 
child of such woman and such husband the same as a natural child 
not conceived by means of artificial insemination.99 
This statute was poorly misconstrued in Welborn v. Common-
wealth,100 where the court stated "[t]he sole issue is whether a man 
by proceeding in accordance with Code § 63.1-221 may adopt a 
child born to his wife by artificial insemination with a third party 
donor's sperm.m01 First, the court twice referred to section 64.1-7.1 
as relating only to inheritance matters, 102 notwithstanding its his-
torical context, and its express language of "for all purposes." Sec-
ondly, the court stated twice that section 64.1-7.1 of the Code 
"merely establishes a presumption,"103 that "a presumption may 
be rebutted when facts to the contrary are established,"104 and that 
"our statutes105 on the subject of artificial insemination are not so 
ambiguous that we could construe them as providing protections 
[against any claims by the sperm donor]."106 
Some response needs to be made to these latter statements. Re-
course to Black's Law Dictionary indicates that the word "pre-
If a person, having had a child, shall afterwards intermarry with the mother or 
father, such child if recognized by both of them, as their own child, jointly or sepa-
rately, before or after marriage, shall be deemed legitimate. 
The issue of marriages prohibited by law, deemed null or void or dissolved by a 
court shall nevertheless be legitimate. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-31.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990). 
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (amended 1991)(emphasis added). 
100. 10 Va. App. 631, 394 S.E.2d 732 (1990). 
101. Id. at 632, 394 S.E.2d at 733. 
102. Id. at 632, 394 S.E.2d at 733-34. 
103. Id. at 633-34, 394 S.E.2d at 733. 
104. Id. at 634, 394 S.E.2d at 733. 
105. The other statute before the court provided in part as follows: "A child born of a 
married woman, who conceived the child by means of artificial insemination with consent of 
her husband, shall be deemed legitimate and the birth certificate of such child shall contain 
full information concerning the mother's husband as the father of the child." Id. at 633, 394 
S.E.2d at 733 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 32.l-257(D) (Repl. Vol. 1985) (emphasis added). 
This section was amended by the 1991 session. For a discussion of the amendments, see 
Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 773 (1991). 
106. Welborn, 10 Va. App. at 635, 394 S.E.2d at 734. 
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sumption" has a number of possible meanings and thus, standing 
alone, is inherently ambiguous. One possible meaning is 
"nonrebuttable;" a fair synonym for "deemed." As the language 
corresponding to the "shall 'be presumed" of section 64.1-7.1 of the 
Code is "shall be deemed" in pari materia section 32.1-257(D),107 
this gives particularly strong support for the ambiguous word "pre-
sumption" in section 64.1-7.1 to be resolved as "nonrebuttable" or 
"deemed." Moreover, the assertion that the legislature intended a 
rebuttable presumption defies all logic because in many, if not a 
majority, of the cases it is a given that the sperm is not that of the 
mother's husband.108 Surely it could not have been the intention of 
this section to create a rebuttable presumption that the mother's 
husband is the father in cases where it is an admitted fact that he 
cannot be. Finally, from a policy standpoint, a "non-rebuttable" 
construction would extend protection to numerous families who, in 
the light of a "rebuttable" construction, may be compelled to sub-
mit to the inconvenience and expense of adoption proceedings in 
order to guarantee their status. 
Fortunately, the 1991 session of the legislature has amended sec-
tion 64.1-7.1 to eliminate the negative impact of this case not only 
for the future but, by providing that this amendment is "declara-
tory of existing law," for the past as well.109 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The 1991 session saw the introduction of several actions affect-
ing the area of wills, trusts, and estates law. An effort to repeal the 
augmented estate section of the Code failed. Many other efforts, as 
revealed in this article, succeeded. 
107. This statute deals with the issuance of birth certificates in cases where children are 
conceived by artificial insemination. See the emphasized words in this statute, partially , 
quoted in supra note 105. 
108. In some cases it is his sperm and other cases it is a combination of his and a donor's 
sperm. 
109. VA. CooE ANN. § 64.7-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991). 
